The explanatory challenge: moral realism is no better than theism

Citation:

Dan Baras. 2017. “The explanatory challenge: moral realism is no better than theism.” Eur J Philosophy, 26, 1, Pp. 368-389.

Abstract:

Abstract Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer-Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer-Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer-Landau's response is implausible as it stands and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.
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Last updated on 01/14/2019